Duquesne Law Review
Volume 49
Number 2 Constitutional Litigaton: Procedural
Protections of Constitutionalism in the
Americas ... and Beyond

Article 5

2011

Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Constitutional
Guarantees in the Americas
John D. Richard

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John D. Richard, Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Constitutional Guarantees in the
Americas, 49 Duq. L. Rev. 145 (2011).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol49/iss2/5

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of
Constitutional Guarantees in the Americas
HONOURABLE JOHN D. RICHARD*
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
The constitution gives the courts the power to rule that a particular law is not valid if it violates the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms ("Charter"), which is itself part of the constitution. The
Charter provides courts with an important power to strike down
laws that violate Charter rights. If only part of the law violates
the Charter, only that part will be ruled invalid.
In Canada, the procedural protections of constitutional guarantees are available in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. Constitutional guarantees can be asserted in any proceeding
before any court or any tribunal. They can be invoked as a sword
or as a shield.
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, states that "anyone
whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by [this] Charter, have
been infringed or denied, may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances."' The remedy may also include an
award in damages.
The Charter also provides that where "a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed . . . any right or
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, that evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circum-

* Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal (Retired), Ottawa, Canada and he
wishes to thank his former law clerk, Livia Aumand, for her research and assistance in the
preparation of this paper.
** [Editor's Note: The following was prepared by Chief Justice Richard as a presentation for the November 2010 Seminar "Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of
Constitutionalism in the Americas ... and Beyond." Duquesne Law Review editors added
footnotes where deemed appropriate so that the reader may locate the cases mentioned for
further information if desired.]
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 24(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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stances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
2
administration of justice into disrepute."
The Charter protects those basic rights and freedoms of all Canadians that are considered essential to preserving Canada as a
free and democratic country. It applies to all governmentsfederal, provincial and territorial-and includes protection of the
following:
3
* Fundamental freedoms, democratic rights

* The right to live and seek employment anywhere in Cana4
da
5
" Legal right: the right to life, liberty and personal security
6
" Equality rights for all
7
* The official languages of Canada
8
" Minority language education rights

" Canada's multicultural heritage 9 and
" Aboriginal peoples' rights. 10
The rights and freedoms in the Charter are not absolute. Section 1 of the Charter says that Charter rights can be limited by
other laws, so long as those limits can be shown to be reasonable
in a free and democratic society."
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that a limit on Charter rights is acceptable if the limit deals with a pressing and sub-

2. Id. at § 24(2).
3. Id. at §§ 1-5.
4.
5.

Id. at § 6.
Id. at § 7.

6. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 15 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
7. Id. at §§ 16-22.
8. Id. at § 23.
9. Id. at § 27.
10. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part II, § 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). See also, Id. at § 29, also
pertaining to Aboriginal peoples' rights.
11. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K.).
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stantial social problem and the government's response to the prob12
lem is reasonable and demonstrably justified.
The Charter sets out several important rules that protect any13
one charged with an offence under federal law or provincial law.
Persons accused of a crime must be told promptly with what offence they are charged; their trials must take place within a reasonable time; and they cannot be forced to testify at their own trials.14
Anyone accused of breaking the law is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty. 15 This means that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person committed the offence,
before he or she can be found guilty. The trial must also be conducted fairly before a court, which is unbiased and independent of
political or any other influence. 16 A fair trial ensures that the
rights of the accused are properly protected.
An accused person is also entitled to reasonable bail and, for
17
very serious charges, has the right to trial by jury.
A court cannot convict a person of a crime unless the law in
force at the time of the offence specifically stated that the actions
in question were illegal.' 8
If a person is tried for an offence and found not guilty, he or she
cannot be tried on the same charge again.' 9 Moreover, if the person is found guilty and punished for the offence, he or she cannot
20
be tried or punished for it again.
In a situation where a person commits an offence and before he
or she is sentenced, a new law alters the fine or term of imprisonment that applies, that person must be sentenced under whichev21
er law is the more lenient.
The Charter makes it clear that every individual in Canadaregardless of race, religion, national or ethnic origin, colour, sex,

12.

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). See generally, EUGENE MEEHAN, ET AL., THE

2000 ANNOTATED CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (2000).
13. MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES CANADA, YOUR GUIDE TO
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, SPECIAL EDITION (2003), available at

http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/pdp-hrp/canada/guide/index-eng.cfm.
14. Id. at §§ 10-11.
15. Id. at § 11(d).
16. Id.
17. Id. at § 11(e)-(f).
18. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 11 (g) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K.).
19. Id. at § 11(h).
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 11(i).
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age, or physical or mental disability-is to be considered equal. 22
This means that the government must not discriminate on any of
23
the listed grounds in its laws or programs.
Because Canada is a federal state, the courts are also empowered to determine the division of legislative powers and, where
appropriate, to declare a legislative provision to be ultra vires by
reason of the division of legislative powers in the Constitution.
The rules of civil procedure in Canadian courts favour the least
the least costly and most expeditious hearing of a matter.
Special proceedings have been developed in Canada to deal with
specific rights, such as a judicial procedure to preserve the confidentiality of a taxpayer's document in the hands of his/her lawyer,
to provide members of the press with notice and an opportunity to
be heard when a party to a judicial proceeding requests that the
press be excluded, and to deal with unacceptable delays to the
24
right of an accused to trial.
The procedural protections of constitutional guarantees can only
be effective if accompanied by an independent judiciary, an independent bar, and a free press. It is also essential that these procedures provide for an effective and binding remedy.
Let me illustrate by reference to real examples of procedures invoked by Canadian courts that allow persons to assert their rights
and the forms of procedures and remedies available to them.
My first example relates to publication bans. Our Supreme
Court has stated in a 2001 decision the following:
A publication ban should only be ordered when such an order
is necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, because reasonable alternative measures
will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the
publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights
and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to
a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration
of justice. The party bringing the application has the burden
of displacing the presumption of openness. That party must
also establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to allow the judge

22. Id. at § 15.
23. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 15 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K.).
24. See infranotes 42-43.
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to make an informed application of the test, and to allow for
25
review.
26
As the Court explained in CBC v. New Brunswick:

The open court principle is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society, fostering public confidence in the integrity of
the court system and understanding of the administration of
justice. This principle is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. The freedom to express ideas
and opinions about the operation of the courts and the right of
members of the public to obtain information about them are
clearly within the ambit of s. 2(b). As well, s. 2(b) protects the
freedom of the press to gather and disseminate this information. Members of the public in general rely and depend on
the media to inform them and, as a vehicle through which information pertaining to courts is transmitted, the press must
be guaranteed access to the courts in order to gather information. Measures that prevent the media from gathering
that information and from disseminating it to the public, restrict the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2(b). To the
extent that such measures prohibit public access to the courts
and to information about the courts, they may also be said to
restrict freedom of expression .... 27
In an earlier decision, Edmonton Journal v. ALTA 28, the Court
framed it in this manner:
Freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a
democratic society and should only be restricted in the clearest of circumstances. It is also essential to a democracy, and
crucial to the rule of law, that the courts are seen to function
openly. The press must thus be free to comment and report
upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are in fact
seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public
scrutiny. It is only through the press that most individuals
can really learn of what is occurring in the courts. The members of the public, as 'listeners' or 'readers,' have a right to re-

25. R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (Can.).
26. (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (Can.).
27. Id.
28. (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (Can.).
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ceive information pertaining to public institutions, in particu29
lar the courts.
The Supreme Court developed what is commonly known as the
Dagenais/Mentuck test and affirmed that it should be applied to
all discretionary judicial decisions that limit freedom of expression
by the press. 30 In Dagenais v. CBC3 1 the Chief Justice suggested
the following general guidelines. He stated:
In order to provide guidance for future cases, I suggest the following general guidelines for practice with respect to the application of the common law rule for publication bans: (a) At
the motion for the ban, the judge should give the media standing (if sought) according to the rules of criminal procedure
and the established common law principles with regard to
standing. (b) The judge should, where possible, review the
publication at issue. (c)The party seeking to justify the limitation of a right (in the case of a publication ban, the party seeking to limit freedom of expression) bears the burden of justifying the limitation. The party claiming the common law rule
that a publication ban is necessary to avoid a real and serious
risk to the fairness of the trial is seeking to use the power of
the state to achieve this objective. A party who uses the power of the state against others must bear the burden of proving
that the use of state power is justified in a free and democratic society. Therefore, the party seeking the ban bears the
burden of proving that the proposed ban is necessary, in that
it relates to an important objective that cannot be achieved by
a reasonably available and effective alternative measure, that
the proposed ban is as limited (in scope, time, content, etc.) as
possible, and there is a proportionality between the salutary
and deleterious effects of the ban. At the same time, the fact
that the party seeking the ban may be attempting to safeguard a constitutional right must be borne in mind when determining whether the proportionality test has been satisfied.
(d) The judge must consider all other options besides the ban
and must find that there is no reasonable and effective alternative available. (e) The judge must consider all possible ways
to limit the ban and must find that there is no reasonable and
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] 3 S.C. R. 835, 891(Can.).
[1994] 3 S.C. R. 835, 891(Can.).
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effective alternative available. (f) The judge must weigh the
importance of the objectives of the particular ban and its
probable effects against the importance of the particular expression that will be limited to ensure that the positive and
32
negative effects of the ban are proportionate.
The guiding rule is that a "judge must accommodate the open
court principle to as great an extent possible without risking a
33
breach of the informer privilege."
The next illustration of court-sponsored procedures in Canada
to ensure the respect of guaranteed rights is the legal structure for
consultation with First Nations concerning the impact of government action on aboriginal rights.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 states that "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada" (which include Indian, Inuit and M6tis peoples) are "recognized and affirmed." 34 It is the main provision dealing with aboriginal and treaty rights. These rights cannot be limited by Section 1 of the Charter.
The leading case on the duty of the Crown to consult with and
accommodate aboriginal groups with claims to land and aboriginal
rights prior to taking action that may adversely affect those inter35
ests is Haida Nation v. British Columbia.
In HaidaNation, the Court stated:
The government's duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and
accommodate their interests is grounded in the principle of
the honour of the Crown, which must be understood generously. While the asserted but unproven Aboriginal rights and title are insufficiently specific for the honour of the Crown to
mandate that the Crown act as a fiduciary. At the same time,
the Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty
and continues beyond formal claims resolution. The foundation of the duty in the Crown's honour and the goal of reconciliation suggest that the duty arises when the Crown has
32. Id.
33. Named Person v. Vancouver SUN, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, para. 55 (Can.).
34. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part II, § 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K).
35. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (Can.).
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knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of
the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that
might adversely affect it. Consultation and accommodation
before final claims resolution preserve the Aboriginal interest
and are an essential corollary to the honourable process of
reconciliation that Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982
demands.
The scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence
of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially
adverse effect upon the right or title claimed. The Crown is
not under a duty to reach an agreement; rather, the commitment is to a meaningful process of consultation in good faith.
The content of the duty varies with the circumstances, and
each case must be approached individually and flexibly. The
controlling question in all situations is what is required to
maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation
between the Crown and the Aboriginal people with respect to
the interests at stake. The effect of good faith consultation
may be to reveal a duty to accommodate. Where accommodation is required in making decisions that may adversely affect
as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims, the Crown
must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and
36
with other interests.
The Court in Haida Nation went on to assert that, "[tihird parties cannot be held liable for failing to discharge the Crown's duty
to consult and accommodate. The honour of the Crown cannot be
delegated, and the legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown. This does not mean, however,
37
that third parties can never be liable to Aboriginal peoples."
Another area with which I wish to deal is that of constitutional
remedies and, in particular, the various methods that Canadian
Courts have utilized in order to tailor the relief to the exigencies of
the situation.
As indicated earlier, if the courts determines that a Charter
right or freedom has been violated and that it is not a reasonable
limit under Section 1 of the Charter, then the court can grant
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
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whatever remedy it feels is appropriate under the circumstances.
The court may also make an order that the law in question is of no
force or effect.
In a criminal case, a court may stay or delay the trial of a person whose rights have been denied. Special remedies are also
available if the government obtains evidence through unreasonable search or seizure.
In R. v. Askov, 38 the Supreme Court of Canada enumerated the
factors, which should be taken into account in considering whether the length of the delay of a criminal trial has been unreasonable
and, therefore, a breach of the accused's right to be tried within a
reasonable time. 39 They are:
1. The length of the delay;
2.The explanation for the delay attributable to the prosecution of the accused and any delays occasioned by systemic or
institutional delays such as inadequate resources;
3. Any waiver of rights by the accused; and;
40
4. Any prejudice to the accused.

The Canadian Supreme Court has devised unique remedies to
deal with concerns, such as the proper institutional division of labour between courts and legislatures. The courts are allowed by
Section 24(1) of the Charter to devise remedies that they consider
"appropriate and just in the circumstances." 4 1 This gives the
courts wide discretion, but remedies must still be responsive and
effective within the unique circumstances of each case.
In Mills v. The Queen, 42 Justice McIntyre wrote:
What remedies are available when an application under s.
24(1) of the Chartersucceeds? Section 24(1) again is silent on
the question. It merely provides that the appellant may obtain such remedy as the court considers "appropriate and just
in the circumstances." It is difficult to imagine language
which could give the court a wider and less fettered discre38. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (Can.).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 24(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K).
42. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, 965 (Can.).
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tion. It is impossible to reduce this wide discretion to some
sort of binding formula for general application in all cases,
and it is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this
43
wide discretion.
In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),"
Judges Iacobucci and Arbour, writing for the majority, wrote:
Purposive interpretation means that remedies provisions
must be interpreted in a way that provides "a full, effective
and meaningful remedy for Charter violations" since "a right,
no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as
a the remedy provided for its breach" [R. v. 974649 Ontario
Inc. 2001 SCC 81, paras. 19-20]. A purposive approach to
remedies in a Chartercontext gives modern vitality to the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right,
there must be a remedy. More specifically, a purposive approach to remedies requires at least two things. First, the
purpose of the right being protected must be promoted: courts
must craft responsive remedies. Second, the purpose of the
remedies provision must be promoted: courts must craft ef45
fective remedies.
Furthermore, in Doucet-Boudreau, the majority indicated that
the following principles should guide the Court in fashioning
Charter remedies: (1) The remedy should meaningfully vindicate
the rights and freedoms of the claimants; (2) The remedy must
employ legitimate means within the framework of our constitutional democracy; (3) The remedy must be "a judicial one, which
vindicates the right while invoking the functions and powers of a
court"; (4) The remedy must, after ensuring that the claimants'
rights are fully vindicated, be "fair to the party against whom the
order is made"; and (5) "[Tlhe judicial approach to [Charter] remedies must remain flexible and responsive to the needs of a given
46
case.
The following types of remedies have been granted:
a. Striking legislation:

43.
44.

Id.
(Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).

45. Id.
46.

Id. at para. 55-59.
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The court makes a determination that the legislation is of no
force or effect.
b. Reading down:
Courts may read down an unconstitutional law by giving it a
constitutionally-compliant interpretation. For example, in R. v.
Grant,4 7 the SCC read down a provision of the Narcotics Control
Act, 48 so that it was compliant with the Charter right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure. 49 One of the reasons this
remedy may be chosen is to "preserv[e] the objectives of Parlia50
ment in so far as it is possible within constitutional parameters.
c. Reading in:
If a law is under-inclusive, such that it does not cover all of
those that should be afforded the constitutional right, the court
may interpret it more broadly. For example, in Vriend v. Alberta, 51 the Supreme Court found that Alberta human rights legislation violated the equality rights guaranteed by Section 15 of the
Charter, since it did not include homosexuality as a prohibited
ground of discrimination. 52 The Supreme Court has stated that
"the purpose of reading in is to be as faithful as possible within
the requirements of the Constitution to the scheme enacted by the
53
Legislature."
d. Suspending invalidity:
If a statute or a portion thereof is struck down as unconstitutional, the invalidity may be temporarily suspended in order to
allow the legislative branch to respond. For example, in Re Manitoba Language Rights, 54 the Supreme Court held that Manitoba's
unilingual legislation violated the language rights protected in the
Charter. 55 However, the Court recognized that immediate invalidation of Manitoba's unilingual legislation would result in an absence of the rule of law (which is an unwritten constitutional prin47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

[1993] 3 S.C.R 223 (Can.).
Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.N-1, s. 10; repealed 1996, c.19, s. 94
R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R 223 (Can.).
Id. at 245.
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, para. 88 (Can.).
Id.
Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 700 (Can.).
[1985] 1. S.C.R. 721 (Can.).
Id.
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ciple) and, thus, allowed a suspension of invalidity until bilingual
56
legislation was enacted.
e. Retaining jurisdiction of the list in some cases:
57
In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),
the Supreme Court examined whether it was appropriate for a
trial judge, after finding that Section 23 of the Charter (dealing
with minority language educational rights) required the Nova Scotian government to use its best efforts to build French-language
school facilities by given dates and to retain jurisdiction to hear
reports on the progress of those efforts. 58 The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge's remedy was appropriate,
given the historical and contextual factors. 59 The Supreme Court
also noted "the government's failure to give due priority to s. 23
60
rights in educational policy setting."
It is also important to consider, if only briefly, the role of judicial
review in administrative law:
Even where a constitutional issue is not involved, the courts
have a varying degree of jurisdiction to review the interaction between the individual and the state.
The Supreme Court of Canada has noted the increasingly important role that administrative tribunals play in the daily lives of
Canadians. 61 As Chief Justice Richard stated in his paper,
"[]udicial review is the principal, and often the only, avenue
62
available to individuals seeking recourse against state action."
In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 63 Justices Bastarache and
LeBel noted that "Ij]udicial review is intimately connected with
the preservation of the rule of law."64 In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court affirmed that "[a]t its most basic level, the rule
of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a
stable, predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(Can.).
62.
63.
64.

Id. at para. 54.
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 39.
Tel. Co. v. Newfoundland (Bd. of Comm'rs of Pub. Util.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, 634
C.J. John D. Richard, JudicialReview in Canada,45 DUQ. L. REV. 483, 484 (2007).
[2008] 1S.C.R. 190, para. 27 (Can.).
Id.
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affairs. It provides a shield for individual from arbitrary state
65
action."
The case, Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)66 dealt with issues of national security:
The individuals in this case alleged that they could be deported
to torture, in violation of their Section 7 right to a fair judicial process. 67 Chief Justice McLachlin indicated the importance that
both the "administrative constraints associated with the context of
national security" and serious individual interests at stake are
considered in determining whether a particular process violates

Section

7.68

She states:

The procedures required to conform to the principles of fundamental justice must reflect the exigencies of the security
context. Yet they cannot be permitted to erode the essence of
s. 7. The principles of fundamental justice cannot be reduced
to the point where they cease to provide the protection of due
process that lies at the heart of s. 7 of the Charter. The protection may not be as complete as in a case where national security constraints do not operate. But to satisfy s. 7, meaning69
ful and substantial protection there must be.
While noting that the right to know the case to meet is not absolute, 70 Chief Justice McLaughlin found that the security certificate
scheme violated Section 7 of the Charter because "[t]he judge is
therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed
scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar
with the case could bring."71 More specifically, she stated:
In the context of national security, non-disclosure, which may
be extensive, coupled with the grave intrusions on liberty imposed on a detainee, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
find substitute procedures that will satisfy s. 7. Fundamental
justice requires substantial compliance with the venerated
principle that a person whose liberty is in jeopardy must be
given an opportunity to know the case to meet, and an oppor65. (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 70 (Can.).
66. [20071 1S.C.R 350 (Can.).
67. Id. at at para 11.
68. Id. at para. 23.
69. Id. at para. 27.
70. Id. at para.58.
71. Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350,
para. 64 (Can.).
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tunity to meet the case. Yet the imperative of the protection
of society may preclude this. Information may be obtained
from other countries or from informers on condition that it not
be disclosed. Or it may simply be so critical that it cannot be
disclosed without risking public security. This is a reality of
our modern world. If s. 7 is to be satisfied, either the person
must be given the necessary information, or a substantial
substitute for that information must be found. Neither is the
72
case here.
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that, while it is for Parliament to decide what must be done to protect the individual and to
keep critical information confidential, the government can do more
than what is currently done under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"). 73 She noted the existence of the special advo74
cate system employed in the United Kingdom.
As a consequence of this decision, Parliament enacted the special advocate system regime as Sections 85 through 85.6 of IRPA
by "[a]n Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential
75
amendment to another Act."
For rights to be meaningful and effective they must be accompanied by procedures to enforce them which are easily accessible
and which produce an effective and binding result.
In a decision released on July 23, 2010, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that damages may be an appropriate and just remedy for a breach of Charter rights. 76 It noted that the Charter
guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Canadians
and provides remedies for their breach. 77 The first and most important remedy is the nullification of laws that violate the Charter
under Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982.78 This is supplemented by Section 24(2), under which evidence obtained in
breach of the Charter may be excluded if its admission would

72. Id. at para. 61.
73. Id. at para. 87.
74. Id. at para. 80, 84.
75. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c.3.
76. City of Vancouver v. Ward, [2010] S.C.R. 28 (Can.).
77. Id.
78. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part VII, § 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K.).
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bring the administration of justice into disrepute, 79 and Section
24(1), under which the Court is authorized to grant such remedies
to individuals for infringement of Charter rights as it "considers
80
appropriate and just in the circumstances."
The Court held that damages may be awarded for Charter
breach under Section 24(1).81 The courts are to follow a four-step
procedure:
1. Establish that a Charter right has been breached.
2. "Show why damages are a just and appropriate remedy,
having regard to whether they would fulfill one or more of the
related functions of compensation, vindication of the right,
and/or deterrence of future breaches."
3. "The state has the opportunity to demonstrate, if it can,
that countervailing factors defeat the functional considerations that support a damages award and render damages inappropriate or unjust."
82
4.Assess the quantum of the damages.

The Court stressed that "these are not private law damages, but
the distinct remedy of constitutional damages."8 3 As a result, the
84
action lies against the state and not against individual actors.

79. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 24(2) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 1 (U.K).
80. Id. at para. 1.
81. Id. at para. 4.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. City of Vancouver v. Ward, [20101 S.C.R. 28 (Can.).

